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 In Defense of Journalistic Paternalism 
Ryan J. Thomas 
Theory is the bedrock of our enterprise as scholars concerned with journalism’s role in 
public life. For Christians (2008), “the long-term future of the field depends on the language of 
theory, not as an abstract authority but to assist us in thinking more systematically about the 
major league issues we face together” (p. 5). Our ability to theorize hinges on clarity over 
concepts; this is perhaps of particular importance to normative theory, concerning impactful 
issues such as how we organize and conduct ourselves, the relationships we have with one 
another, and the rights and responsibilities we bear both in terms of our common humanity and 
because of the particular roles we occupy. 
The goal of this essay is to introduce paternalism into our theoretical lexicon and defend 
it as a normatively positive concept. The term is perhaps best known through its semi-frequent 
invocation in debates about government regulation, raising questions about the purview of the 
state relative to the individual (Cornell, 2015). Such discourse often positions paternalism as a 
prime facie wrong, possessing undesirable connotations of a “nanny state” presuming to know 
what is best for us. The concept has also been used in recent journalism scholarship, albeit as a 
shallowly theorized bogeyman out-of-step with the current vogues of participatory journalism 
and “democratized” processes of media production. Within journalism ethics scholarship 
specifically, paternalism is subject to critique but is rarely afforded sustained explication as a 
substantive concept in its own right. 
Given the above, why paternalism? There is a growing body of literature in applied ethics 
and political philosophy that takes paternalism seriously as a normatively positive concept. This 
vigorous discussion is illustrative of how paternalism represents “an important realm of applied 
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ethics” (Dworkin, 2014, para. 8). I want to bring this conversation into our field, connecting 
debates about paternalism with our current discourse as media ethicists about the responsibilities 
of journalists in a democracy, which ought to be the bedrock of media ethics theorizing (Allen & 
Hindman, 2014). I want to rescue paternalism from criticism and ignorance and take it seriously 
as a concept that can add much to our theorizing about journalism ethics. There are, I maintain, 
meaningful synergies between theorizing about paternalism and our theorizing in media ethics. If 
our discussions of paternalism henceforth can come from a place of shared reference, our field 
will be richer for it. Simply, I believe it possible to establish fruitful ways of thinking about 
paternalism that ought not inspire fear or scorn. 
The structure of this essay is as follows. First, in order to contextualize the occasion for 
this argument, I outline some of the explicit and implicit objections to paternalism in recent 
scholarship in journalism studies generally, and journalism ethics specifically. Second, I turn to 
the fundamental normative objections to paternalism, outlined principally by Immanuel Kant and 
John Stuart Mill, on the grounds that paternalism undermines human autonomy and claims to 
human rationality. Third, I explicate paternalism, discussing recent scholarship in applied ethics 
and political philosophy to provide a rounded account of its contours. Fourth, I apply paternalism 
to journalism by drawing on recent scholarship on paternalism. Specifically, I discuss: how the 
notion of “bounded rationality” that questions the liberal tradition’s emphasis on autonomy 
underpinned by human rationality calls for a more analytical form of journalism; how the concept 
of “nudging” citizens toward welfare-enhancing outcomes through “choice architecture” 
(Sunstein, 2014; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 2008) is complimentary to journalists’ democratic 
functions; and how the shift in emphasis away from autonomy toward opportunity and civic 
equality is theoretically synergistic with virtue ethics and its associated concepts of flourishing 
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and goods, as discussed by Borden (2010) and Ward (2011). I conclude with some final 
comments about paternalism and its implications for journalism. 
Journalistic Paternalism: The Contemporary Critique 
A major work on normative theory argues that the citizen participation represents the 
underlying conception of the good in our present epoch (Christians, Glasser, McQuail, 
Nordenstreng, & White, 2009). The citizen participation paradigm emphasizes the “bottom-up” 
nature of public life, characterized by the empowerment of citizens to harness processes of 
technological change to create their own media and subvert or bypass the existing media 
structure. The underlying logic of the citizen participation tradition holds “that the media belong 
to the people,” and fulfills “an emancipatory, expressive, and critical purpose” (Christians et al., 
2009, p. 25). Reflecting this, the embrace of participatory journalism in recent scholarship in 
journalism studies is emblematic of a broader embrace of the promises of digital technologies to 
inspire a democratic awakening and draw more citizens into the workings of journalism. The 
aspiration of scholars working in this field is that citizens can harness software like blogs, wikis, 
video-sharing sites, and social networking sites and hardware like the cellphone, to participate in 
the process of newsmaking and thus collapse the boundaries between journalist and audience 
(Borger, van Hoof, Costera Meijer, & Sanders, 2013). 
Journalism scholars have invoked paternalism to characterize the “changing of the 
guard,” so to speak, as an “old” media system characterized by hierarchies, closure, and control 
gives way to a “new” media system characterized by participation, openness, and fluidity. 
Bardoel and Deuze (2001), for example, discuss how “the shift in the relationship between 
supplier and user to the advantage of the latter changes the old, paternalistic relationship into a 
new, more pragmatic arrangement and leads to a new emancipation of the information user” (p. 
In Defense of Journalistic Paternalism 3 
101). Anderson (2011) mentions how journalism’s “somewhat paternalistic vision of its audience 
[has] historically served to blunt the impact of whatever limited audience measurement 
technologies might influence news production” (p. 554). Brants and Voltmer (2011) write of 
journalists taking “the needs and interests of their audiences more seriously,” which means “the 
disappearance of journalistic paternalism should be welcome” (p. 7), while Skovsgaard and van 
Dalen (2013) argue that journalists ought to take “a more open, citizen-oriented focus rather than 
[a] closed, paternalistic approach” (p. 376). 
Criticisms of paternalism (or a form of it) are implicit in scholarship that emphasizes the 
“democratization of media production” (Lewis, Kaufhold, & Lasorsa, 2010, p. 164) and popular 
works whose titles reveal their normative inclinations, such as We the Media (Gillmor, 2004) and 
We’re All Journalists Now (Gant, 2007). Such works emphasize how “the news is no longer the 
sole purview of the press” (Robinson, 2007, p. 318) and the maligned “we write, you read” 
(Deuze, 2003, p. 220) model, characterized by “media imposing the content on users whose only 
option is to consume or not to consume the news” (Karlsson & Strömbäck, 2010, p. 4) is 
consigned to history. 
Considered in the aggregate, both implicit and explicit critiques pivot away from the idea 
of journalists paternalistically presuming to know what is in the best interests of the public, 
contrasting the rhetorical violence of imposition with a liberalized utopia of choice. Of concern 
here is that these arguments valorize transformations that at least ought to be questioned, if not 
resisted outright. The normative logic of neoliberalism (see, e.g., Harvey, 2005) centers on 
decentralization, deinstitutionalization, and the flattening of hierarchies, theorizing society as a 
constellation of autonomous, unencumbered, and disarticulated individuals capable of 
consistently and precisely determining their own interests and exercising rational choice to 
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maximize them. That the balkanizing tendencies of neoliberalism seem to be reflected in the 
aforementioned arguments is troubling and deserves further reflection. The particular concern 
here, however, is what this means for the concept of paternalism, which is regularly invoked but 
irregularly explicated. 
Within the journalism ethics literature, scholars have discussed paternalism but generally 
positioned it as an undesirable concept. Plaisance (2013a), for example, discusses the importance 
of journalists making decisions about the public interest “without being paternalistic and 
condescending – without assuming that they know best what their audience need even if people 
object” (p. 125). Similarly, Borden (2010) describes paternalism as “condescending to others by 
making choices for them” (p. 112). Stoker and Tusinski (2006), though writing about public 
relations, caution against a “paternalistic approach to communication” characterized by an “elite 
father” and “noble disciple” (p. 166), invoking paternalism’s gendered and hierarchical 
implications. A more favorable account comes from Vanacker and Breslin (2006), who associate 
paternalism with feminist care ethics, which “assumes that the best decision for the care recipient 
emerges from the dual relationship between caregiver and receiver” (p. 209). However, this 
account does not go on to argue explicitly for paternalism as a normatively positive concept. 
Within the journalism ethics literature, then, paternalism is rarely explicated as a 
substantive concept in its own right, meriting scrutiny as a concept with the potential to add to 
our theoretical lexicon. However, if we look at the literature from other realms of applied ethics 
and political philosophy, there is a lively discussion about paternalism and its contours and 
contexts, from which there is much we can learn. However, if paternalism is to be defended, it 
must first be defined. The next section outlines the particulars of paternalism and addresses how 
paternalism challenges the liberal philosophical traditions strident emphasis on rationality and 
autonomy. Thus, the next section answers the questions: What is this thing called paternalism, 
anyway? And what is all the fuss about? 
Origins and Objections 
Etymologically, paternalism is derived from the Latin pater, meaning father, indicating a 
parental – and specifically father-child – relationship.
1
 The term was first used in the nineteenth 
century as “an implied critique predicated on the inherent value of personal liberty and 
autonomy, positions elegantly outlined by Kant in 1785 and Mill in 1859” (Thompson, 2008, p. 
1574). Paternalism, then, was introduced into the lexicon as a normatively negative term, 
deployed as a means of delineating an argument for autonomy, with its development as a concept 
and normative proposition in its own right much later. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that 
paternalism tends to be viewed as “intrinsically normatively negative” (Bullock, 2015, p. 3) in 
much of the discourse around the topic. Later efforts to outline paternalism’s conceptual 
properties and present a compelling case for its merits have had to swim against this tide (Ben-
Porath, 2010). The objections to paternalism are part of its history and woven into its conceptual 
DNA, so to speak. Therefore, it is logical to begin with discussion of Kant and Mill before we 
can focus our discussion on the conceptual properties of paternalism in its own right. 
Kant’s deontological approach is centered on the capacity of humans for rational thought 
and the ability to act on the basis of reason. Kant’s conception of rational agency underpins his 
1 This, of course, has gendered implications, as it locates familial authority specifically in the father. I intend no such 
implications by my use of the concept, which is born out of convenience and clarity, given that it is the established 
term in the literature. To be clear, there is no connection present, suggested, or desired between “paternalism” and 
“patriarchalism.” These concerns are summarized by Kleinig (1984): “This is not merely because it locates de jure 
familial authority in the father, but also because it obscures the de facto (though unrecognized and unrewarded) 
childrearing authority that generally resides in the mother. Perhaps we should... speak instead of “maternalism”... But 
there is more to be said for talking of “parentalism,” an option taken up by one or two writers, and toward which I am 
attracted. I have chosen nevertheless to bow to convention, not through some desire to perpetuate the sexist 
environment from which it comes, but for reasons of convenience. The general sense of the traditional term remains 
clear, some of the confusion caused by a terminological switch is avoided, and given the generally derogatory 
associations that the term has for most users, its continued use is not likely to advance the cause of sexism” (p. xiii). 
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emphasis on human dignity, for it is on the basis that individuals are self-possessed moral 
agents that they are capable of making decisions for themselves without external interference. It 
is in their rationality that humans are autonomous; this makes humans of intrinsic worth as 
directors of their own life-projects. This is key to Kant’s moral enterprise, conceiving as he 
does of morality as “deriving from reason and of people being in charge of their moral destiny” 
(Le Grand & New, 2015, p. 106). This is underscored in Kant’s categorical imperative, one 
formulation of which commands us to “act as to treat humanity... in every case as an end 
withal, never as means only” (Kant, 1785, p. 56). From this perspective, to treat another human 
as a means to ends they have played no hand in deciding undermines their dignity and violates 
the categorical imperative. Treating others as ends in themselves affords them the respect of our 
shared humanity. 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859) outlines a framework calling for limits on the 
powers that the state can use over the individual, and the majority over a minority within a 
society. Mill grounds his arguments in autonomy, holding that “the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, it to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant” (p. 
22). This is the essence of Mill’s harm principle, holding that interference in the affairs of another 
is justifiable only if harm can come to a third party. Mill venerates “framing the plan of our life to 
suit our own character... without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do 
does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong” (pp. 
26-27). Mill held that individuals were the best judges of their own interests, as they knew more 
about themselves than any external agent could. Because they know their own interests, they will 
generally make wise decisions, for “it is the privilege and proper condition of 
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a human being arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own 
way” (p. 104). Individuals ought to be allowed to err; to interfere with their decision-making 
processes, even when that interference may objectively improve his or her condition, is to rob 
them of their autonomy. Mill, for example, wrote of how “over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign” (p. 22) and that “all errors which the individual is likely to 
commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain 
him to what they deem his good” (pp. 137-138). For Mill, “with respect to his own feelings and 
circumstances, the ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing 
those that can be possessed by anyone else” (p. 137). 
Demonstrating consequentialist reasoning, Mill (1859) describes it as necessary to nurture 
“the human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even 
moral preference” (p. 105) and as “quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress” 
(p. 102). For Mill, autonomy relates to intellectual, dispositional, and emotional capacities, where 
human capacity for “creativity, aesthetic and emotional sensitivity, self-control, initiative and 
foresight, independence, judiciousness, [and] moral and religious discrimination” are autonomy-
derived traits that define us as humans and separate us from other species (Kleinig, 1984, p. 25). 
The positive consequences of prioritizing individual autonomy are bountiful for both the 
individual and their sense of self, and society at large. 
Kant and Mill’s aggregated arguments provide powerful testimony in favor of autonomy 
underpinned by human rationality. Autonomy becomes sacrosanct, elevated over other goods 
such as the benevolence that may prompt a paternalistic intervention, or the welfare-enhancing 
outcomes of such an intervention. Acting on behalf of another – presuming to be better able to 
ascertain their interests than they – is to treat that individual as “merely an instrument... and not 
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as a project-maker in his own right” (Kleinig, 1984, p. 68) by robbing them of the good central to 
life’s meaning that is found in autonomy. 
However, as subsequent philosophers have noted, both Kant and Mill provide scope for 
some particularized paternalistic intervention. For example, in his discussion of suicide 
intervention, Cholbi (2013) notes that “by making liberty the handmaid of rational autonomy, the 
Kantian opens the door to justifiable paternalism” (p. 116). Cholbi argues, “some interferences 
with individual liberty can help us achieve our rationally chosen ends instead of thwarting them” 
(p. 116). Specifically, paternalistic interventions can be justified on Kantian grounds if “we stand 
a reasonable chance of preventing [the agent] from performing actions she chose due to distorted 
reasoning and which would result in that agent’s rationally chosen ends not being as fully 
realized as they would have been had she so acted” (p. 118). 
As for Mill, while he is correctly regarded as one of the principle theorists in stressing the 
import of autonomy, he excepted selling oneself into slavery as an example whereby paternalistic 
intervention by a third party was permissible. In his argument against conscripting oneself into 
servitude, Mill noted that in doing so, an individual “abdicates his liberty” and “foregoes any 
future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose 
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself” (Mill, 1859, p. 184). Mill thus 
carves out an exception on the basis that restrictions on an individual’s autonomy in the short 
term are desirable if they protect or enhance their autonomy in the long term. Put differently, “we 
may be justified in interfering with someone’s autonomy to prevent her from having less 
autonomy in the future” (Le Grand & New, 2015, pp. 126–127). 
These exceptions notwithstanding, Kant and Mill’s arguments provide the strongest case 
against paternalism and the backdrop against which advocates of paternalism must struggle 
In Defense of Journalistic Paternalism 9 
(Ben-Porath, 2010). The default assumption that guides much of the general debate around 
paternalism proceeds from the assumption that “human beings are best capable of determining 
and pursuing what is in their own interest” (Thompson, 2008, p. 1576). Paternalism is seemingly 
placed on the defensive because it not only questions this core assumption but then proceeds to 
trample on the autonomy that the assumption bequeaths. This superseding of judgment is found 
in pejorative definitions of paternalism as “a special relation between two people, one of whom 
looks down on the other as incompetent to manage his affairs” (Buckley, 2009, p. 19), predicated 
on the assumption “that the subject does not know what is in her interest or what is good for her” 
(Rostboll, 2005, p. 383). Indeed, the etymology of paternalism invokes the inescapable power 
dynamic of the father-son dyad that, for paternalism’s critics, needlessly infantilizes the 
paternalized, treating them as incapable agents of their own life-plan. For Cornell (2015), the 
problem with paternalism is that, simply, it “expresses something insulting” (p. 1315). However, 
we have not yet arrived at a clear understanding of what paternalism actually is. The next section 
moves us further along that path. 
Definitions and Conceptual Properties 
Following Mill, there followed “several decades of relative silence about paternalism” in 
ethical and political philosophy (Thompson, 2008, p. 1575), until the concept was revived by 
Gerald Dworkin (1971) in a seminal essay that was the first to take paternalism seriously as a 
concept in its own right and provide a working definition and explication of its properties. 
Dworkin defined paternalism as “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by 
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the 
person being coerced” (p. 108). There are three criteria that constitute paternalism under 
Dworkin’s rubric: Interference (an intervention, broadly conceived, in the subject’s capacity to 
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choose for themselves); Coercion (whereby the subject does not consent to the interference or 
have a say in its nature); and Benevolence (whereby the interference is conducted with 
benevolent intent). 
Subsequent scholars in applied ethics and political philosophy have expanded upon 
Dworkin’s work, generating a lively body of literature but one marred by a general lack of 
agreement on a clear definition of what constitutes paternalism (Le Grand & New, 2015). For 
example, scholars have offered an expansive view of what “interference” can constitute, moving 
beyond simply freedom of action to incorporate freedom of information (Buchanan, 1978). Such 
interference may be found in acts, omissions, diminished opportunities to choose, and 
substitutions of judgment (Bullock, 2015; Clarke, 2002; Le Grand & New, 2015). 
The benevolence condition is a reminder that paternalism is inherently relational and 
concerns how we treat people. When we engage in paternalistic conduct, we interfere with their 
autonomy for benevolent reasons. Any such paternalistic action, then, cannot be understood as an 
action alone but an action motivated by reasons born of that relationship. For Grill (2007), “the 
normative core of paternalism is the invocation of the good of a person as a reason for 
interference with her” (p. 441). 
Drawing these works together, one is drawn to a definition of paternalism that addresses 
the manifold dimensions of paternalistic interventions and the contexts in which they occur. 
Therefore, Clarke’s (2002) definition of paternalism as any action that “aims to close an option 
that would otherwise be open... in order to promote [the paternalized’s] good” (p. 89) seems 
particularly useful to this end, given its broad applicability to areas such as journalism, which 
does not intrude directly upon liberty of action but provides the interpretive framework for 
decision-making, which Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008) describe as “choice architecture. 
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Beyond these core criteria, scholars have differentiated between different types of, and contexts 
for, paternalism. Some key distinctions are between paternalism as broad or narrow, hard or soft, 
strong or weak, negative or positive, and moral- or welfare-oriented. 
The question of broad versus narrow paternalism concerns the paternalist. Narrow 
paternalism strictly concerns state coercion (Dworkin, 2014). Indeed, much of the early literature 
on paternalism concerned the state and the extent to which it could compel or punish conduct on 
paternalistic grounds (Kleinig, 1984). On the other hand, broad paternalism, as one might guess, 
concerns an array of actors and institutions beyond the state. As illustrated by the ample 
literature from applied ethics, such actors may include teachers and school administrators (Ben-
Porath, 2010), researchers (Jansen & Wall, 2009) and healthcare professionals (Buchanan, 1978). 
Soft and hard paternalism concern the issue of agent autonomy. Hard paternalism is 
characterized by a concern for the safety and welfare of a person that advocates restrictions on 
liberty above their objections, even when the person “is fully cognizant of his or her actions and 
their consequences” (Thompson, 2008, p. 1575). Soft paternalism, on the other hand, is concerned 
with protecting and enhancing the autonomy of individuals, “justifying restriction of liberty only 
to ascertain whether the person in question were indeed choosing to harm or endanger himself or 
herself with full volition and knowledge of the facts” (Thompson, 2008, p. 1575). Put another 
way, soft paternalism occurs when the paternalist suspects the rationality of individuals is in 
question, or when their capacity for rational processing is compromised (Sunstein, 2014; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2003, 2008). In similar fashion, weak and strong paternalism concerns the relationship 
between means and ends. Weak paternalism holds “that it is legitimate to interfere with the means 
that agents choose to achieve their ends, if those means are likely to defeat those ends,” while 
strong paternalism “believes that people may have mistaken, confused 
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or irrational ends and it is legitimate to interfere to prevent them from achieving those ends” 
(Dworkin, 2014, para. 25). 
Negative and positive paternalism concerns the distinctions between interventions to 
prevent harm and interventions to promote good. Le Grand and New (2015) use the example of 
seat belt laws as a form of negative paternalism and subsidies for leisure facilities as a form of 
positive paternalism. The underlying distinction here is between paternalism as non-maleficence 
versus paternalism as beneficence. 
Finally, moral and welfare paternalism differ on the nature of the good or harm yielded. 
Whereas moral welfare is concerned with the moral wellbeing of the person and their character, 
welfare paternalism is concerned more broadly with maximizing the opportunities to improve an 
individual’s circumstance (Dworkin, 2014). Le Grand and New (2015) define moral paternalism 
as the prevention of “moral harm,” which excludes “physical, psychological, and economic 
harm” (p. 35), which would be considered the preserve and priority of welfare paternalism. 
How might this pertain to journalism? Clearly, journalism can be categorized as a kind 
of broad paternalism, given that it involves non-state actors. My specific concern is for a 
journalistic paternalism that is soft, in the sense that it intervenes to provide a “choice 
architecture” to audiences whose decision-making is compromised (Sunstein, 2014; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2003, 2008); weak insomuch as it intervenes to achieve the ends of citizens flourishing 
as whole persons in a democracy; positive in the sense that journalists act to promote welfare-
enhancing outcomes; and welfare-oriented rather than moralistic, insomuch that it aims to 
provide citizens with the tools they need to self-govern. Of course, these preliminaries require 
further expansion. In the next section, I draw on recent work in applied ethics and political 
philosophy to put flesh on these proverbial bones. 
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Applying Paternalism to Journalism 
This section applied the general principles outlined above to journalism, illustrating how 
paternalism can be a useful lens for conceiving of journalism. First, I discuss empirical research 
from behavioral economics that posits that we exist in a state of “bounded rationality” where our 
capacity for rational thought is compromised, calling for a journalism that creates the conditions 
for analytical processing. Second, I discuss how the concepts of “nudges” and “choice 
architecture” (Sunstein, 2014; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 2008) can inform our understanding of a 
journalistic paternalism that is non-coercive yet guides audiences toward welfare-enhancing 
outcomes. Third, I outline how the aspirations of paternalism are synergistic with those of virtue 
ethics, which has been the subject of renewed interest in media ethics scholarship recently (see, 
e.g., Borden, 2010; Craig, 2011; Plaisance, 2013b; Ward, 2011). Drawing primarily on the work 
of Sigal Ben-Porath (2010), I discuss how paternalism shifts the focus away from autonomy 
toward the expansion of opportunity and civic equality. Accordingly, I suggest that these 
aspirations should constitute part of journalism’s telos. 
From Rationality to Bounded Rationality 
For Kant, our autonomy is underpinned by our rationality. It is our capacity for rational 
thought that distinguishes us as humans and makes us worthy of respect. This point about human 
rationality – the crux of the argument against paternalism’s alleged autonomy-threatening instincts 
– is an empirical claim, and one that has been investigated by behavioral economists. Their 
insights have informed subsequent normative theorizing by advocates of paternalism. It ought not 
be controversial to suggest that we are not capable of consistently and precisely determining, and 
acting upon, our best interests as a result of the range of confounding variables 
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that interfere with our ability to do so. In fact, this is a plainly sensible proposition, supported by 
ample empirical research. 
Paternalists hold that people are neither inherently rational nor irrational but, rather, that 
they operate under bounded rationality, a term that stems from the work of political scientist 
Herbert Simon and was extended by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, key figures in the 
development of behavioral economics (for a summary, see Kahneman, 2011). Behavioral 
economics emerged largely as an attempt to empirically test the normative belief in human 
rationality. The findings of these scholars and others offers as its core premise that humans are 
not optimal, in the sense that our rationality and therefore capacity for optimal decision-making 
is constrained by limited information, cognitive capacity, and time. Bounded rationality 
acknowledges that people have to make decisions on matters of extraordinary complexity 
under conditions that are frequently less than optimal. 
These limitations indicate that the agent has difficulty consistently and precisely locating 
their goals, given their insufficient ability to do so. They instead rely heuristics, intuition, and 
emotion to make decisions (Kahneman, 2011). Empirical research finds, for example, that we 
select on the basis of cognitive ease, as indicated in empirical research showing that, in the 
absence of factual knowledge, people preferred statements constructed in simpler and more 
memorable language when faced with choices between false statements (Kahneman, 2011). 
Research also indicates our short supply of attention means we tend to disregard information 
unless and until it is made salient to us (Sunstein, 2014). 
Decades of empirical research has led Kahneman (2011) to conclude that the human 
brain possesses two “cognitive systems.” The first is fast, automatic, and impulsive, relying on 
emotion, intuition, and “gut feeling.” The second is slow, deliberative, and reflective, requiring 
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greater cognitive energy and intervening when the first system’s instincts run against the 
individual’s decision-making rules. System 1 deals with situations when there is little time for 
deliberation, necessitating an immediate response, while System 2 deals with long-term 
planning, prompting conscious, controlled effort. Kahneman finds that System 1 is often our 
default, while System 2 intervenes when necessitated by circumstance. For situations 
necessitating immediate action, the intuitive system is clearly preferable. On the other hand, for 
situations requiring a sober examination of available options, the analytical system is preferred. 
Reflecting on the empirical work of Kahneman and others, Sunstein (2014) argues that 
“often because of System 1, people err. We need to strengthen the hand of System 2 by 
promoting self-control, reducing unrealistic optimism, unshrouding attributes, counteracting 
biases, and eliminating an undue focus on the short term” (p. 154). The goal of paternalism is to 
create the conditions for analytical processing, steering the subject toward analytical thinking. 
Put another way, paternalism attempts to create architecture that allows for more light and less 
heat in cognitive processing.
2
 
What might this mean for journalism? Certainly it suggests that we need a cooler 
journalism that allows for System 2 processing. Journalism organizations should consider the 
preponderance of conflict-driven reporting and partisan commentary and whether this allows for 
analytical thinking. The nonprofit news organization Voice of San Diego, by way of illustration, 
counsels its reporters to “bring us the implications, not the event.” A deeper meaning to news is 
sought. 
2 None of the above is to afford some kind of superhuman privilege to journalists and claim they are immune from 
bounded rationality while everyday citizens are not. Journalists, however, have role-derived responsibilities that 
the ordinary citizen does not, training that the ordinary citizen does not, and access to various forms of capital 
(economic, social, political, cultural) that the ordinary citizen does not. Moreover, the concern of this body of work 
is on the reception, rather than transmission, side of the communication dynamic. 
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Perhaps an analytic, explanatory journalism is one way forward. Drawing on the 
empirical research on cognition, journalists ought to commit themselves to presenting 
information in a manner that creates the conditions for System 2 processing yet acknowledging 
that cognitive processes are shaped by ease of retrieval and salience. The recent trend of 
“explanatory journalism” as pioneered by outlets like Vox is notable. Launched by former 
Washington Post reporter Ezra Klein in April 2014, Vox uses “card stacks” to accompany each 
article that provides readers with regularly updated context, history, and definitions on a given 
topic. Such context is presented in an easily navigable way without detracting from the 
readability of the main article. Vox’s chatty, lively style and easily navigable design emphasizes 
that analysis need not be dreary. 
There are other creative options available to journalism. The use of “listicles” (a 
portmanteau of “list” and “article”) – short-form writing on thematic, ranked, or chronological 
criteria (as especially pioneered by organizations like BuzzFeed) – may be another avenue. Klein 
was a notable pioneer of the listicle format as a writer for the Washington Post, such as an article 
on “10 things that could go very wrong if we attack Syria” (Klein, 2013). The article is rich on 
content but presented in the kind of style and tone that explains without either pandering or 
patronizing. This kind of creative explanation keeps journalism’s core mission in mind while 
being nimble in adapting to the cognitive needs of audiences. The cold, disengaged style that 
characterizes conventional journalism may need to give way a more conversational, intimate 
style that might engage audiences better, make issues salient, and allow for Track 2 processing. 
The strictures of AP style need not define the kind of journalism we need to make people 
passionate about journalism and democracy. 
From Interference and Coercion to Nudges and Choice Architecture 
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Paternalism has, it must be conceded, acquired a problematic vocabulary. A concept that 
revolves around such terminology as “interference,” “interventions,” and “coercion” is 
admittedly unlikely to win admirers even with a favorable audience. Cass Sunstein and Richard 
Thaler, two figures pivotal to recent discussions about paternalism, draw heavily on the empirical 
insights of behavioral economics to argue for a soft/weak conception of paternalism centered 
around the notion of “nudges” (Sunstein, 2014; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 2008). This is more 
than just an exercise in semantics or an attempt to reframe the argument; nudges represent a 
specific form of paternalism that need not be direct or coercive. Rather, it advocates that 
paternalists devise “initiatives that maintain freedom of choice while also steering people’s 
decisions in the right directions” (Sunstein, 2014, p. 17). Individuals should be nudged toward 
welfare-enhancing outcomes by arranging their choices such that they will do what achieves the 
ends of making them flourish. Examples may include arranging a cafeteria such that healthy food 
is more visible or accessible than unhealthy food or arranging employee retirement or benefit 
programs to be opt-out rather than opt-in are examples of nudges. In such cases, freedom of 
choice, and thus autonomy, is preserved. The goal is “influencing the choices of affected parties 
in a way that will make those parties better off” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, p. 175). Following the 
semantic logic, a nudge can be contrasted with a “shove,” which would constitute a kind of hard 
paternalism that would restrict autonomy (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
Associated with this is the notion of “choice architecture.” Choice architecture constructs 
the horizons of possibility for us. It is, as Sunstein (2014) notes, inevitable that choices will be 
structured a particular way – the normative question at stake is a matter of how those choices are 
structured. It follows, therefore, for paternalists that those choices should be structured in the 
most welfare-enhancing manner possible. Paternalistic “choice architects,” therefore, strive to 
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construct the choices available to citizens in a manner that bolsters their welfare and their ability 
to flourish. For Thaler and Sunstein (2008), “a good system of choice architecture helps people 
improve their ability to map and hence to select options that will make them better off” (p. 94). 
This is wholly concomitant to what we could expect of journalists in a democracy. We could 
therefore accept is as reasonable for journalists to function as “choice architects” arranging the 
news horizon to democracy-enhancing ends. The concept of “nudges” removes the rhetorical 
violence of imposition and replaces it with one centered on benevolence, while ultimately 
respecting the autonomy of the audience member to do with that information what they will. 
The normative question at issue here, therefore, is not whether journalists have a role to 
play in constructing the choice architecture. At its most basic level, journalism is a series of 
choices about what to cover and how. The key question lies in the normative value of the 
architecture provided. For Sunstein (2014), “a key question is whether the choice architecture is 
helpful and simple, or harmful, complex, and exploitative” (p. 15). We could ask the same 
questions of journalism. In assessing journalistic performance, we ought to ask whether the 
provided choice architecture – the journalism, in other words – is “helpful and simple” or 
whether it is “harmful, complex, and exploitative.” 
This yardstick neatly aligns with what we expect of journalism in a democracy. Allen and 
Hindman (2014) argue that democracy ought to be the wellspring from which journalistic ethics 
are extrapolated and that normative evaluations of journalistic performance must address “what 
role the press – as an institution within a democratic system – ought to play in society” (p. 185). 
Discussing government paternalism, Cornell (2015) writes that “the permissibility of a policy 
will often depend on whether it coheres with a democratic state-citizen relationship or a 
hierarchical power dynamic between the governing and the governed” (p. 1335). This means, 
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therefore, that the justification for journalistic paternalism ultimately lies in the extent to which 
it coheres with the functions journalism plays – and must play – in the maintenance of a self-
governing society. Put simply, does journalism nudge citizens toward democracy-enhancing 
outcomes or not? Rather than dismiss paternalism outright, we need to consider journalistic 
paternalism in the context of journalism’s democratic functions. 
This may also invite further consideration of transparency as a journalistic norm. 
Paternalists recognize the need for “a heavy and clear burden of proof” in order to “demonstrate 
the exact nature of the harmful effects (or beneficial consequences) to be avoided (or achieved) 
and the probability of their occurrence” (Dworkin, 1971, p. 126). Paternalistic actors ought to 
demonstrate their respect for persons and treat them as ends rather than means by publicly 
explaining their decision-making. Explaining to audiences the rationale for journalistic decisions 
and priorities, backed by empirical data whenever possible, can only serve to bolster journalistic 
credibility and paternalistic authority. 
From Autonomy to Opportunity and Civic Equality 
The growing interest in virtue ethics in our field, inspired largely by Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
After Virtue (1984) and his elaboration on practices, represents an important development in our 
theorizing. It shifts our attention to the kind of goods journalism provides and facilitates in a 
democracy, with particular attention to its capacity for creating the conditions for human 
flourishing or eudaimonia. MacIntyre sought to revive an Aristotelian and teleological (goal-
based) understanding of ethics at a time when the hold of liberalism seemed hegemonic. 
MacIntyre was concerned by the liberal tradition’s over-emphasis on autonomy (and resultant 
under-emphasis on community) at a time when the corrosive effects of capitalism were at its 
most pernicious, moving society away from the common good through the valorization of 
material acquisition and moral relativism. This is particularly pertinent in our present, neoliberal 
times (Harvey, 2005). 
Other scholars have ably summarized MacIntyre’s work and its application to journalism 
(see, e.g., Borden, 2010; Craig, 2011) and in the interests of space I will not regurgitate these 
summaries here. An implicit part of my argument is the need for journalism to remain a “form of 
socially established cooperative human activity” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 175). This is to say that the 
deinstitutionalized version of journalism preferred by digital utopians is unlikely to achieve the 
kind of internal goods that an institutionalized version of journalism can. The focus should surely 
be on ascertaining a structure that allows for a robust, “socially established” journalism to 
continue fulfilling its democratic functions. 
Borden (2010) argues that understanding journalism as a practice provides “a useful 
framework for thinking about journalism as a cooperative endeavor guided by a sense of moral 
purpose” (p. 21). The agent-relative nature of practices is important because it “suggests that the 
way to understand ethics is in terms of pursuing a telos, that is, the good of a whole human life; 
the telos hinges partly on doing one’s role-related work well” (Borden, 2010, p. 16), and the telos 
of journalism is inextricably linked to its functions in a democracy. The critique of journalistic 
paternalism implicitly suggests that such “role-related work” ought to be dispersed widely. 
However, the very nature of a role implies a measure of uniqueness, in terms of accepting 
particular role-relative responsibilities that distinguish the bearer from others. This then becomes 
tautological: if a role is dispersed – indeed, if a role is universalized – it ceases to be a role and 
lacks the moral justification that accompanies it. It becomes, instead, a decentralized free-for-all. 
The concept of human flourishing, or eudaimonia, is central to virtue ethics. Broadly, it 
means making the most of your talents in the pursuit of excellence in your practice to create the 
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conditions for ultimate human happiness. Virtue ethics calls us to live well and do so in a manner 
that helps others to flourish in addition; it calls journalists to “embrace the... morally ambitious 
goal of helping people flourish as human beings” (Borden, 2010, p. 51). Ward (2011) argues for 
human flourishing as the telos of journalism; that is, the goal to which journalism ought to be 
oriented, articulating the individual, social, political, and ethical goods that constitute necessary 
aspects of human dignity. For Ward, this demonstrates journalism’s “simultaneous commitment 
to liberty and equality” (p. 743). The different kinds of goods of life represent a robust 
conception of the manifold ways in which human potential can be unleashed and “provides a 
target at which responsible journalism can aim” (Ward, 2011, p. 738). 
How, then, does this relate to paternalism? Philosophers of paternalism recognize that the 
liberal tradition’s all-encompassing emphasis on autonomy does not square with the realities of a 
society where autonomy is unequally and inequitably distributed, and stratified by circumstances 
beyond our control. Our autonomy is further limited by the fact that we are prone to undue 
influence, manipulation, and coercion. A hollow understanding of autonomy neglects ways that 
we might conceive of our role in relation to others. For Ben-Porath (2010), our understanding of 
autonomy has become conflated with choice, where the guiding measure of one’s autonomy is 
the ability to exert choice. As a result, “the normative power of choice overwhelms any empirical 
input into the question of its role in human society” (p. 15). 
Empirical research shows, however, that people want to live purpose-driven lives in order 
to realize their full potential, not simply exercise choice to maximize pleasure or happiness as part 
of some reductive utilitarian calculation (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, & Rees-Jones, 2012; 
Steger, Kashdan, & Oishi, 2008). Adopting a paternalistic orientation means we reframe the 
conversation to prioritize opportunity. If, as noted, paternalism ultimately embodies relationships 
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built on nurturance, it calls us to expand the opportunities of others so that they may make 
meaningful choices and expand their autonomy. Paternalism creates the necessary breathing 
space for citizens to make meaningful choices rather than exert choice unhindered. It thus 
becomes a normative goal to “take an active role in equalizing and expanding opportunities 
rather than leaving it to individuals to make up their life story, under the false pretense that they 
are doing it as free and equal members of society” (Ben-Porath, 2010, pp. 41–42). 
This means that a journalism truly grounded in paternalism is not grounded in the 
remoteness, elitism, or arrogance that critics of paternalism may decry, but in connection, 
compassion, and recognition that it is a normative aspiration of journalism to expand the 
opportunities of citizens so that they may flourish and live the good life. Paternalism commands 
the moral agent to use their power, talents, and resources to bolster the good of others and 
recognizes that society functions best not through disaggregation but through social solidarity, 
where the strong help the weak and the information-rich help the information-poor. 
According to Sigal Ben-Porath (2010), paternalism is a necessary part of the realization 
of civic equality, “a main charge of a democratic society” (p. 19). For Ben-Porath, “civic 
equality should be understood as tied not only to autonomy and freedom but also to the 
conditions for wellbeing that are satisfied when appropriate opportunities are presented in the 
individual’s landscape of choice” (p. 7). Paternalism, then, is an attempt “to improve the 
circumstances or wellbeing of others while keeping in minds their inferred needs” (p. 20). 
Ultimately, paternalism “consists of a dedication to advancing the good of individuals, and 
subsequently supporting their levels of civic equality by designing positive opportunities for 
them to be equal members of society and to pursue their goals” (p. 25). 
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At a minimum, this calls for journalists to serve as guides helping citizens reach 
democratic maturity, providing them with the intellectual armor necessary for political 
participation. It helps them appreciate an expansive understanding of democracy that does not just 
mean occasional visits to the ballot box. Moreover, it calls journalists to be guardians of civic 
equality. Recent years have seen laws passed in the United States curtailing individuals’ voting 
rights on the dubious grounds of voter fraud. This is a clear and present threat to civic equality. At 
the same time, Supreme Court rulings like Citizens United v. FEC have gutted campaign finance 
reform, mangling American democracy by vastly increasing corporate power over citizens. Being 
paternalistic in respect to civic equality means adopting a position as a champion of democracy 
not in a shallow, self-serving sense but in calling the public’s attention to those issues where civic 
equality is under mortal threat. There is much to learn from the public journalism movement of the 
1990s, in this regard. The aforementioned Voice of San Diego may be one such exemplar, with a 
mission statement that commits the organization to “increase civic participation by giving 
residents the knowledge and in-depth analysis necessary to become advocates for good 
government and social progress” (Voice of San Diego, n.d., para. 6). 
Journalists should make the improvement of public life a normative goal, playing a key 
role in ensuring good governance and the protection of the rights of all. Paternalism calls for a 
journalism that gives people the tools they need to flourish in a democracy and address those 
issues that prevent them from doing so. Perhaps we are in need of a journalism-driven 
“democracy audit,” with features, magazine special issues, and documentaries focusing on the 
state of contemporary American democracy. Such an audit would necessarily be self-reflexive 
about journalism’s own performance in the polity’s democratic wellbeing. It is surely preferable 
for journalism to orient itself to the material world, where democracy is increasingly being 
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curtailed and citizens’ ability to participate in democracy is under threat, rather than meander 
down the blind alley of participation in journalism. 
At the same time, paternalism emphasizes the responsibilities that we have toward one 
another. Paternalism calls for “a more robust responsibility of society toward the individual” 
(Ben-Porath, 2010, p. 9), acknowledging that we need the support of others in order to live the 
good life. To accept the need for paternalistic institutions is simply to recognize that no one is an 
island; if we are to flourish, we need the help of others. There is a case to be made, therefore, for 
the complementarity of paternalism with communitarianism, which holds that we do not exist as 
isolated atoms but as interdependent, social beings. Both paternalism and communitarianism are 
set against the thin conception of autonomy that has denied the relational nature of life and 
stymied recognition of communal interests. 
Conclusion 
This essay is, in part, an effort to find productive ways of thinking about paternalism that 
challenge how it’s meaning has been fixed (and degraded) by its opponents. Following Bullock 
(2015), “the mere fact that anti-paternalists have dominated the use of the term does not mean 
that paternalism should pick out something that is intrinsically morally unacceptable” (p. 5). 
While there has been a lively and robust conversation about paternalism in other realms of 
applied ethics and political philosophy, the concept has thus far not been imported into our 
vernacular as journalism ethicists. Indeed, most of the discourse around paternalism, both within 
journalism ethics and in journalism studies more generally, has been to situate paternalism as a 
normatively negative concept. I want to swim against this tide, and maintain that there are fruitful 
ways of thinking about paternalism that readily comport with our current theorizing about 
journalism ethics and about the roles we expect journalism to fulfill in a democracy. 
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Paternalism is a theoretical position worth defending and a practical avenue worth 
exploring. To be sure, there is more to be done to address how this applies across journalistic 
contexts and platforms; the arguments here exist to be revised and agitated against. I do not 
regard this as the final word on journalistic paternalism; rather, I hope it is the first. The most 
urgent task is to defend paternalism on its merits; as Ben-Porath (2010) notes, winning 
legitimacy for paternalism in a liberal democracy is a critical prelude to defending specific acts 
of paternalism. Neither do I claim paternalism as a cure-all; there is much about contemporary 
journalism that remains vexing, not least how we fund it in light of the gradual collapse of the 
advertising-based revenue model. Perhaps acceptance of paternalism means we can shift our 
concern to ascertaining a sustainable structure that makes paternalistic journalism viable. 
The opposition to paternalism within journalism is understandably rooted in a resistance 
to an elite, remote, and arrogant kind of journalism disconnected from audiences. I hope the 
discussion I have provided here challenges some of our thinking about paternalism so that we 
rescue this useful concept from derision. Moreover, I simply cannot accept the notion that 
journalistic paternalism has been one of its key failings in the execution of its democratic 
functions. If, for example, the failings of journalists in their coverage of the Iraq War or of the 
build-up to the 2008 global financial crisis teach us anything, it is that journalists were 
insufficiently paternal. Put bluntly, we need more paternalistic journalists, not less. 
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